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Each year, approximately 795,000 people in the United States will have a stroke 
(American Heart Association, 2010).  Many stroke survivors who resume driving have 
residual physical, cognitive, and perceptual deficits that may impair the knowledge and 
skill necessary to drive safely, and an estimated 30 to 75% resume driving after their 
stroke (Mazer, Gelinas, & Benoit, 2004). Although the requisite skills for driving a motor 
vehicle are not completely known, it is evident that driving requires high-level cognitive, 
perceptual, and motor functioning.  Although many stroke survivors have residual 
impairments in these domains (Gillen, 1998), disabilities are not, of themselves, related 
to increased risk of adverse driving incidents (Haskelhorn et al., 1998; Hopewell, 2002; 
van Zomeren et al., 1987). Compensatory skills and psychological factors such as 
motivation and awareness of deficit substantially influence fitness to drive (Hopewell et 
al., 1990; Ryan et al., 2009; Kumar, 1991; Lundqvist et al., 2000). Traditional evaluation 
methods such as neuropsychological and on-road testing, as well as modern 
technologies such as driving simulators, can substantially improve prediction of fitness 
to drive (Akinwuntan et al., 2002; Klavora et al., 2000; Korner-Bitensky et al., 2000; 
Lundberg et al., 2003; Lundqvist et al., 2000; Mazer et al., 1998; Nouri, 1987, 1993); 
however, evidence suggests that survivors and their significant others frequently do not 
make their decisions about resumption of driving based on such evidence. Research on 
populations with disabilities other than stroke indicates that the relation between 
objective indices of fitness to drive and perceptions of fitness to drive are generally 
much poorer than would be desired for valid decision-making (Coleman et al., 2002; 
2 
 
Kelly, 1999). Thus, survivors and their significant others may be making this important 
determination based on inaccurate information.  It may be possible to evaluate 
survivors’ and significant others’ awareness and accuracy of survivor’s driving ability 
through an objective index of driving fitness, the driving simulator. 
Stroke Sequelae and Fitness to Drive 
Stroke survivors may face any number of neuropsychological, cognitive, and 
physical impairments as the result of infarct and damage to the connecting brain 
structures (Coleman Bryer, Rapport, & Hanks, 2005; Gillen, 1998). Many of the 
impairments stroke survivors may incur involve those skills necessary for safe driving 
(e.g., sensory and motor functioning, visuospatial abilities, processing speed, attention, 
memory, and problem solving; Bryer et al., 2004; Innes et al., 2007). Stroke survivors 
have been shown to perform significantly worse than healthy controls (matched for age, 
gender, education, and driving experience) on tasks measuring a wide variety of 
domains, including simple reaction time, processing speed, attention, short-term and 
long-term memory, language, and general cognitive processing (Lundqvist, Gerdle, & 
Ronnberg, 2000; Sundet et al.,1995).  However, research on the relative influences of 
impairments in these domains in discriminating between drivers and non-drivers post 
stroke has produced mixed results (see Akinwuntan et al., 2002; Klavora et al., 2000; 
Mazer et al., 1998; Nouri et al., 1987).  Similarly, deficits in basic sensory-perceptual 
functions do not necessarily compromise driving ability (Fisk, Owsley, & Mennemeier, 
2002). 
Some studies indicate that survivors of right-hemisphere strokes are at greater 
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risk for automobile accident than are survivors of left-hemisphere strokes (see Bryer, 
Rapport & Hanks, 2004 for review). For example, Chaudhuri (1987) found that 60% of 
right hemiparetic patients and 40% of left hemiparetic patients were able to drive 
successfully post-stroke.  These findings make sense given that deficits in visuospatial 
ability and attention are more common following right-hemisphere stroke (Heilman et al., 
2003). In contrast, several studies found no relationship between laterality of stroke and 
driving outcomes (Akinwuntan et al., 2002; Chaudhuri, 1987; Cushman et al., 1999; 
Jones, 1983; Lings et al., 1991; Mazer et al., 2003; Sundet et al., 1995). Some research 
indicates that deficits associated with left-hemisphere stroke (Fisk et al., 2002) such as 
aphasia (Golper, Rau, & Marshall, 1980; MacKenzie et al., 2003) are sufficient to 
compromise fitness to drive substantially. For example, Mackenzie and Paton (2003) 
suggest that aphasic stroke survivors should not automatically be precluded from 
driving but that an inability to recognize road signs and difficulty with reading 
comprehension might be counter-indicative to driving. One problem in evaluating the 
literature regarding laterality of stroke and fitness to drive is that many studies exclude 
persons with aphasia. Also, survivors of left-hemisphere stroke may be referred for 
driving evaluations less often than survivors of right-hemisphere stroke, whose typical 
deficits are more obviously related to driving fitness. 
Visuospatial neglect (i.e., hemi-inattention), a deficit common among survivors 
who sustain right-hemisphere stroke, has been found to be a significant predictor of 
whether survivors were approved to drive post-stroke (Sundet, Goffeng, & Hofft, 1995).  
While in driving simulators, stroke survivors with neglect displayed less eye and head 
movement than did similarly aged controls with normal vision; in contrast, stroke 
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survivors with hemianopia (visual field cut) but without neglect displayed more head 
movement than the normal controls (Szlyk, Brigell, & Seiple, 1993).  This finding may 
indicate that survivors with sensory-only vision problems can adjust for their limitations; 
however, the sample for this study consisted of only 6 stroke survivors, only 3 of whom 
had neglect and simulator time was limited to 5 minutes.  
Several authors have suggested that risk for accidents is moderated by higher-
order cognitive abilities such as executive functioning (Coleman et al., 2002; Daigneault 
et al., 2002; Hopewell, 2002; Mazer et al., 1998; Rapport et al., 1993; Schanke et al., 
2000). In addition to regulating skills essential to driving such as complex attention and 
multi-tasking, self-regulatory aspects of executive control affect the functional capacity 
of other cognitive and motor functions. For example, the functional range of peripheral 
vision is inversely related to cognitive load; thus, peripheral vision can be intact but 
hindered by the complexity of the cognitive challenge (Fisk et al., 2002). The component 
of executive functioning associated with self-awareness of deficit appears particularly 
important to driving fitness (Bogod, Mateer, & MacDonald, 2003; Burgess, Alderman, 
Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998; Ryan et al., 2009).  Yet, many stroke survivors resume 
driving despite increased risk associated with impairments for which they cannot 
compensate safely.  Knowledge of accident risk alone may not be sufficient to alter 
behavior patterns (McKenna & Horswill, 2006). It is not clear whether these survivors 
inaccurately believe that they are fit to drive (Heikkilä, 1999) or drive despite knowledge 
that they are at high risk (Lings, 1991). The accuracy of perceptions regarding fitness to 




Self-awareness of deficit   
Clearly, a stroke survivor’s awareness of residual deficits can be an important 
factor in whether they are fit to drive.  Persons who are aware of their deficits are less 
likely to engage in high-risk behavior that exceeds their abilities than are persons who 
do not fully appreciate their deficits, and underappreciation of even mild deficits can 
substantially increase risk if the person chooses to drive (Rapport et al., 1993). Self-
monitoring functions of executive control are essential to driving risk, because 
awareness of deficit moderates the recognition of need to invoke appropriate 
compensatory strategies (Rapport et al., 1993, 1998a, 1998b).   
Unawareness of deficit is commonly observed following stroke. Traditional 
literature on anosognosia, the unawareness of illness or deficits, purports that it is more 
commonly observed following right-hemisphere insult than left-hemisphere insult 
(Heilman et al., 2003; Jehkonen, Laihosalo, & Kettunen, 2006; Karnath, Baier, & 
Nägele, 2005, Spalletta, Ripa, Bria, Caltagirone, & Robinson, 2006).  Lesion mapping in 
27 stroke survivors (Karnath, Baier, & Nägele, 2005) indicated that anosognosia for 
hemiplegia/hemiparesis was significantly associated with right posterior insula lesions 
as compared to individuals with hemiplegia/hemiparesis but awareness of their deficits. 
Jehkonen, Ahonen, Dastidar, Laippala, and Vilkka (2000) found that among patients 
with acute right hemisphere infarction, there was a double dissociation of anosognosia 
for neglect and hemiparesis, as well as anosognosia for neglect and unawareness of 
illness.  This finding is consistent with the general literature in a variety of neurological 
disorders indicating that unawareness can be domain specific rather than a global 
phenomenon (Hart, Sherer, Whyte, Polansky, & Novack, 2004; Sherman et al., 2007).  
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Among stroke survivors, awareness is multidimensional and may differ across domains 
(see Orfei et al., 2007 for detailed review; Vallar & Ronchi, 2006; Vuilleumier, 2004). 
Fischer, Trexler, and Gauggel (2004) used a mixed neurological sample of 
traumatic brain injury (TBI), stroke survivors, and orthopedic controls to examine 
possible domain differences, as well as awareness of activity limitations, using the 
Patient Competency Rating Scale (Prigatano & Fordyce, 1986).  Participants predicted 
how they would perform on a test of motor ability (finger tapping) and cognition (list 
learning). Neither group over-predicted performance on simple motor tasks in any of the 
groups; however, the TBI/stroke group overestimated on the cognitive task with the TBI 
participants showing greater overprediction than stroke participants.  When comparing 
staff and participant ratings in activity limitations, the control group with orthopedic injury 
underestimated and the TBI/stroke group overestimated their level of functioning on the 
total score and on the social/emotional subscale.  Participant and staff estimates were 
in agreement on the physical/self-care subscale. 
Similarly, in a study of 87 stroke survivors, comparison between self-ratings of 
cognitive abilities and the ratings of hospital staff members on the same measures, 
revealed little agreement (Gauggel, Peleska, & Bode, 2000).  There were moderately 
high correlations between cognitive test scores and ratings made by staff, but much 
lower correlations between the tests and self-ratings provided by survivors. Conversely, 
when comparing patient and significant other reports of ability, these authors found that 
the largest discrepancy in ratings occurred in the evaluation of motor activities. On 
cognitive and emotional aspects, patients actually rated themselves as more impaired 
than significant others did (Gauggel, Peleska, & Bode, 2000).  A possible explanation 
7 
 
for this deviant finding is that patients’ cognitive deficits were the focus of therapy or 
conversation with significant others due to safety concerns and therefore were more 
salient during questioning.  Similarly, the discrepancy between patient and significant 
other ratings on motoric ability may be due to lack of awareness by the patient or the 
significant others’ safety concerns and desire to monitor patient activity level.  Previous 
work (Coleman et al., 2002; Rapport et al., 2006; Scott et al., 2009) has demonstrated 
that significant others frequently control patients’ mobility by “holding the keys” when 
determining if stroke survivors can resume driving. 
These studies indicate that stroke survivors may have differential awareness of 
their deficits and strengths across domains (Orfei et al., 2007).  Theories offered to 
explain impaired awareness of deficit help clarify differential awareness of deficits. 
General theories (Flashman & Strong, 1995; Flashman, Amador, & McAllister, 
1998; Allen & Ruff, 1990) of self-awareness distinguish between psychological and 
neuropsychological/cognitive factors and levels of awareness.  Deficits threatening to 
the individual may not be fully processed and therefore awareness is limited. 
Vuilleumier (2004) suggested that patients must complete three steps (ABC: 
Appreciate, Belief, Check) to have full awareness of their deficits. Defects in “ABC” 
functioning could differentially apply to domains of functioning, explaining dissociations 
in awareness. General theories of awareness also suggest that there is an executive or 
supervising control function directing subordinate cognitive skills.  Research has found 
that executive functioning deficits in set-shifting and flexibility are more frequent in 
patients with impaired self-awareness (Starkstein, Fedoroff, Price, Leiguarda, et al., 
1993). Memory impairment (Marcell et al., 2004), specifically the failure to integrate new 
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information regarding deficits and impairments in attention (Starkstein et al., 1992) has 
also been postulated to explain lack of awareness.  Damage to subcortical circuits, as a 
result of the stroke, may affect a survivor’s ability to self-monitor and adjust based on 
novel experience (Vuilleumier, 2000). 
Cognitive estimation and awareness of deficit.  
Cognitive abilities required to estimate the extent of deficits are related to awareness 
of deficit. Impairments in cognitive estimation abilities in a variety of domains have been 
observed among persons with lesions to the frontal lobes (Shallice & Evans, 1978; 
Smith & Milner, 1984; Della Sala et al., 2004), as well as neurological disorders such as 
Alzheimer's disease (Brand et al., 2003; Della Sala et al., 2004), alcoholic Korsakoff’s 
disease (Brand et al., 2003; Della Sala et al., 2004; Shoqeirat et al., 1988; Taylor & 
O'Carroll, 1995), and post-encephalic amnesia (Leng & Parkin, 1988; Shoqeirat et al., 
1988). Prior research has demonstrated some relation between cognitive estimation 
and education (Della Sala, MacPherson, Phillips, Sacco, & Spinnler, 2003) and general 
intelligence (Brand et al., 2003), although studies have found the associations to 
general intelligence, as well as depression and state anxiety, very small in comparison 
to semantic memory (Freeman, Ryan, Lopez, & Mittenberg, 1995). At least one study 
has reported an effect of gender among healthy adults, with women performing more 
poorly than men; however, age was not associated with performance (Della Sala et al., 
2003).  
Many theories proffer that cognitive estimation is primarily related to executive 
functioning (e.g., Silverman, Hanks, & McKay, 2007; Shallice & Evans, 1978), although 
some research has not supported this association (Appollonio et al., 2003; Spencer & 
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Johnson-Greene, 2008; Taylor & O'Carroll, 1995). Recent theories posit an additional 
role of semantic memory systems as important to cognitive estimation, given the 
importance of both executive and semantic systems to problem-solving and “plausibility 
checks” (Brand et al., 2003; Della Sala et al., 2004; Freeman, Ryan, Lopez, & 
Mittenberg, 1995). Deficits in both of these domains are commonly observed following 
stroke.  
The observation of deficits in cognitive estimation following stroke has a direct 
bearing on risk and fitness to drive: Awareness of deficit is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to reduce risk, because persons who acknowledge having deficits must also 
accurately assess their severity in order to invoke compensatory behaviors that are 
proportionate to the need. Additionally, preliminary research on self-assessment of 
driving ability among 67 stroke survivors (Scott et al., 2009) suggests that fundamental 
abilities in cognitive estimation pervade self-estimates: The tendency to over- or under-
estimate external stimuli on a cognitive estimation task was significantly associated with 
self-estimates of driving ability (rho = .48).   
Therefore, stroke survivors may face the inability to accurately assess driving 
ability as well as any number of deficits that disrupt the actual ability to drive safely.  
Thus, objective measures of fitness to drive are important. 
Predicting fitness to drive after stroke.  
A well-accepted and standardized method of assessing whether a stroke survivor 
can and should resume driving has not been established. The deficits that stroke 
survivors typically experience are easier to elucidate than are the specific skills 
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necessary for safe driving. However, a variety of methods have been developed to help 
predict driving ability. These include neuropsychological evaluations, on-road 
evaluations, use of driving simulators, and clinical judgments by health professionals 
that are made both with and without information from these resources.  
On-road testing is considered a criterion standard in driving evaluations 
(Akinwuntan et al., 2005, Jones, Gidden, and Croft, 1983; Korner-Bitensky et al., 1998; 
Soderstrom, Pettersson, & Leppert, 2006) but it is expensive and may pose 
unnecessary safety risks. Additionally, on-road testing may not illuminate subtle 
psychological and motor impairments that affect fundamental driving skills (Klavora, 
Heslegrove, & Young, 2000).  Further, hazardous situations are difficult to replicate 
during on-road testing, leaving therapists without evidence of how survivors might 
handle these scenarios. 
In general, research indicates that neuropsychological assessment is useful in 
predicting fitness to drive following stroke (Akinwuntan, Feys, DeWeerdt, Pauwels, 
Baten, & Strypstein, 2002; Klavora, Heslegrave, & Young, 2000; Korner-Bitensky, 
Mazer, Sofer, Gelinas, Meyer, Morrison, 2000; Lundberg, Caneman, Samuelsson, 
Hakamies-Blomqvist, & Almkvist, 2003; Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 2000; Mazer, 
Korner-Bitensky, & Sofer, 1998; Nouri et al., 1993; Nouri, Tinson, & Lincoln, 1987). In a 
brain injury population, the overall accuracy rate of a cognitive battery in predicting a 
failing score on the road was 92% and it was 71% in predicting a passing score 
(McKenna, Jefferies, Dobson, & Frude, 2004). Although a significant relationship 
between neuropsychological functioning and driving ability (as measured by on-road 
and off-road testing) has been found in a meta-analysis of driving studies with a 
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dementia population (Reger, Welsh, Watson, Cholerton, Baker, & Craft, 2004), the 
same work suggested that neuropsychological tests should not be used as the only 
decision criterion, and this opinion has been supported by most experts in evaluation of 
driving fitness (see Bryer et al., 2005).  The use of neuropsychological measures that 
tap multiple cognitive domains relevant to driving seem to best predict driving ability 
(Marshall et al., 2007). Executive functioning, processing speed, and visuospatial 
processing are among the domains typically tested in examining fitness to drive.  
Despite this recommendation, recent work has shown that a very brief 
neuropsychological screen (measures of visual neglect and Rey Complex Figure), in 
addition to on-road testing, showed good prediction of fitness to drive after stroke as 
defined by medical team decision (Akinwuntan et al., 2006). 
Driving simulators are also available to test driving fitness (Klavora et al., 2000). 
The use of driving simulators and virtual reality may provide a more realistic and cost-
effective driving and testing experience without the obvious safety risks of on-road 
testing (Schultheis & Mourant, 2001). Additionally, the use of driving simulators allows 
the evaluation of driving ability over a period of time (Mazer et al., 2004) and may allow 
for the best balance of safely assessing driving ability while attempting to test reaction 
to difficult situations (Bieliauskas, 2005). 
Although there is little research examining the validity of driving simulators 
among stroke populations, the clinical utility of driving simulators has improved (Lew et 
al., 2005).  One study to examine the efficacy of driving simulators and fitness to drive in 
a stroke population was conducted by Nouri and Tinson (1988).  The authors compared 
performance on a driving simulator with on-road examinations in 38 stroke survivors. 
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Results of the study must be interpreted with caution because the simulator that they 
used considered green light acceleration and braking reaction time only; however, the 
simulator was helpful in predicting fitness to drive in the majority of survivors. 
Research examining the relation between driving simulator performance and on-
road performance has produced mixed results (Monga, 1997; Owsley, 1998; Keller, 
Kesserling, & Hiltbrunner, 2003; Galski et al., 1992; and Lundqvist et al., 2000).  One of 
the most favorable studies for the driving simulator (Lundqvist et al., 2000) indicates that 
the driving simulator is capable of correctly classifying the overall driving skill of 85% of 
stroke survivors. 
Despite the availability of objective indices of driving safety, they are not 
frequently pursued.  Stroke survivors are often released from the hospital with no advice 
from their physicians regarding driving (Goodyear & Roseveare, 2003; Fisk, Owsley, & 
Mennemeier, 2002; Fisk, Owsley, & Pulley, 1997; Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 
2000). Fisk et al. (2002) reported that 33% of stroke survivors received advice about 
driving from physicians and 27% received advice from family members.  Therefore, it is 
important to determine how individuals make the decision to resume driving. 
Self-assessment of driving ability  
Many stroke survivors appear to self-regulate their driving behavior (Fisk, 
Owsley, Pulley, 2002).  Evidence of this fact may be observed in the low rate of return 
to driving among stroke survivors (Fisk, Owsley, Pulley, 1997; Legh-Smith et al. 1986; 
Fisk, Owsley and Mennemeir, 2002), as well as a reduced number of days and miles 
driven per week (Fisk et al., 2002; Mackenzie & Paton, 2003), an avoidance of 
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challenging environments such as night driving, heavy traffic, and inclement weather 
(Fisk et al., 2002), and an increase in compensatory behaviors (Mackenzie & Paton, 
2003). It is important to consider that many of these studies relied exclusively upon self-
report, which requires survivors to be aware of and accurately estimate both the deficits 
they may possess and the verity of compensatory behaviors they actually carry out. 
Additionally, reductions and limitations of this nature may reflect the influences of 
external forces, such as the decisions of significant others or health care professionals. 
In fact, prior research on populations with disabilities other than stroke (e.g., TBI) 
suggests that significant others frequently maintain the greatest influence on whether 
and how much survivors drive (Coleman et al., 2002; Rapport et al., 2006).  
Decision to drive after stroke  
The decision regarding whether to resume driving after stroke is a complex 
endeavor. Support from family is essential to successful rehabilitation, including return 
to driving (Schanke et al., 2000). Advice from family or health care professionals can 
have a substantial influence on this decision-making process (Coleman et al., 2002; 
Fisk et al., 1997; Schanke et al., 2000).  
Unfortunately, survivors and family members rarely have sufficient knowledge to 
form opinions on an empirical basis. For example, the relation between survivors’ 
perceptions of their restrictions and actual medical contraindications to driving is weak 
(Kelly et al, 1999). Additionally, among persons with TBI, significant others appear to 
have the most influence regarding whether the survivor will resume driving and how 
much they will drive (Coleman et al., 2002; Rapport et al., 2006); however, the relation 
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between the survivor’s actual fitness to drive and the significant other’s perceptions of 
that ability appears only modest at best (Coleman et al., 2002).  This issue raises an 
important concern, because significant others may be limiting the stroke survivor’s 
driving unnecessarily or encouraging resumption of driving among survivors who are 
unsafe to drive.   
Scott et al., (2009) examined the opinions of stroke survivors and their significant 
others regarding domains considered important in deciding whether survivors should 
resume driving. Consistent with prior research on persons with TBI (Coleman et al., 
2002; Rapport et al., 2006), ratings by significant others were, in general, more strongly 
related to survivors’ actual driving status than were ratings made by the survivors 
themselves. Although 55% of significant others reported that professional advice was an 
important consideration, the extent to which they received and used this information in 
their decision-making process was not clear. In fact, professional advice was not among 
the chief domains most strongly associated with survivors’ actual driving status (eta = 
.23), which included sensory (eta = .55), physical (eta = .34), and cognitive (eta = .29) 
functioning, as well as finances (eta = .23), emotional functioning (eta = .14) and 
judgment (eta = .13). Equally important, survivors did not consider professional opinion 
nearly as important to their decision-making process as the other domains (?): Only 
convenience/ease (71.6%) was rated “quite a bit” or more important a consideration by 
more than 50% of stroke survivors; no other domain was rated even “somewhat” or 
more important by more than 50% of the survivors. This previous description of test 
results seems a little bit difficult to follow.  
Driving is an important aspect of community integration and sense of adult self.  
15 
 
Among individuals with disabilities, driving cessation can adversely affect social 
participation, occupation, and social mobility, as well as feelings of connectedness and 
freedom from social limitations (Anderson et al., 2002; Kiyono et al., 2001; Kreutzer et 
al., 2003; Siosteen, Lundqvist, Blomstrand, Sullivan, & Sullivan, 1990). Other studies 
have linked cessation of driving to feelings of loneliness (Johnson, 1999), anger, and 
frustration related to limitations on vocational and recreational activities (Hallett, Zasler, 
Maurer, & Cash, 1994); adverse changes in personal roles (Hallett et al., 1994); and 
feelings of diminished autonomy and mobility (Johnson, 1999; Lister, 1999).  Alternative 
transportation, when available, is often not an acceptable solution because of 
inconvenience, unreliability, and lack of spontaneity (Brown et al., 2004, Coleman Bryer, 
Rapport, Hanks, 2004; Rapport, Coleman Bryer, Hanks, 2008).  Additionally, the same 
physical or cognitive limitations that restrict driving may make public transportation 
difficult (Rapport, Coleman Bryer, Hanks, 2008).  Given these challenges, the 
importance of independent transportation is clear. 
Some stroke survivors resume driving despite increased risk associated with 
impairments for which they cannot compensate safely, whereas other survivors who 
could resume driving safely do not do so. Accurate self-assessment of driving skill is 
essential to making valid decisions regarding whether to resume driving; yet, stroke 
survivors are particularly susceptible to unawareness of deficit. Moreover, although 
survivors’ significant others appear to have a great deal of influence on survivors’ 
driving outcome, no research has established the validity of their perceptions of the 
survivor.  
A factor inherent in judgments of the survivor made by both survivors and their 
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significant others is the well established finding that most individuals tend to 
overestimate their own driving ability.  
Ratings of driving ability 
A large body of literature indicates that most individuals tend to overestimate the 
safety and skill of their own driving (Finn & Bragg, 1986; Gregersen, 1996; Groeger & 
Brown, 1989; Mathews & Moran, 1986; McKenna, Stanier & Lewis, 1991; Svenson, 
1981).  Svenson (1981) found that 88% of US drivers and 77% of Swedish drivers 
considered themselves safer than the average driver.  Furthermore, 93% of US 
respondents and 69% of Swedish respondents felt they were more skillful than the 
average driver.  Although this seminal study has been faulted for numerous design 
flaws (Groeger & Brown, 1989; Groeger & Grande, 1996), subsequent studies using a 
variety of improved designs have confirmed the fundamental finding that adults typically 
rate themselves as above-average drivers (see Groeger & Grande, 1996 for review). In 
one study, participants rated themselves as less likely to get in a traffic accident and as 
having more driving skill and driving judgment than their peers (Glendon, Dorn, Davies, 
Matthews, & Taylor, 1996).  It is important to note that most studies of driving self-
assessments have focused on adults (e.g., college students) much younger than the 
average stroke survivor. However, Marottoli and Richardson (1998) reported that the 
majority of their sample of adults age 77 years and older also rated themselves as 
above-average drivers.  Scott et al. (2007) found that 47% of stroke survivors rated 
themselves as better-than-average or excellent drivers. In fact, 54% of survivors who 
were currently driving and nearly 40% of survivors who had ceased driving rated 
themselves as currently better-than-average or excellent drivers.  
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Interestingly, Marottoli and Richardson (1998) found no relationship between a 
history of adverse driving events and self-assessment of driving ability.  Twenty-seven 
percent of their sample rated their ability as better than their peers’, even when 
independent judges rated them as having moderate to major problems on the road or 
when they had a history of adverse events on the road.  In fact, even feedback in the 
form of an on-road driving test and criticism by professional driving evaluators did not 
appear to alter fundamental self-ratings of driving ability (Groeger & Grande, 1996): 
Drivers’ self-assessments of their general ability provided months prior to such an 
experience best predicted self-assessments of their ability after a road test. In the 
presence of explicit criticism during driving, self-ratings of the on-road performance itself 
were related to objective indices of the performance (e.g., number of errors during the 
task); however, self-ratings of general driving ability were unrelated to assessments of 
them provided by the driving instructor. Moreover, in the absence of performance 
feedback (i.e., criticism from the evaluator), drivers' self-ratings were unrelated even to 
their performance on the immediate on-road task (Groeger & Grande, 1996). This 
finding may provide insight into effective strategies for psychoeducation and drivers 
training of stroke survivors who have impaired self-awareness.   
This rating of self as superior to the average driver appears to be a stable trait 
characteristic, rather than a state characteristic that responds and shifts in accordance 
with recent data about driving ability.  Groeger and Grande (1996) discuss the “driving 
self” in the context of Markus and Nurius’ (1986) theory of the self, as an enduring self-
view that becomes increasingly entrenched and resistant to change over time and with 
experience. These authors suggest that in the absence of some extreme event (e.g., a 
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severe accident), external feedback is ineffectual, and the driving self is unlikely to be 
accurate or amenable to long-term change.  In general, drivers’ self-ratings are far less 
variable than are the ratings they assign others (e.g., novice drivers or “average” 
drivers; Groeger & Grande, 1996).  Feedback about driving performance tends to lower 
how an individual rates an imaginary other driver and generally affects ratings of 
nondescript drivers much more than self-ratings. Drivers’ self-views of their ability are 
stable over time, and these self-assessments are very weakly related to objective 
indices of their skill. 
Two theories have been proposed as explanations for drivers’ over-confidence in 
their own abilities.  Like its well-known predecessor, Festinger’s social comparison 
theory (1954), Wills’ downward comparison theory suggests that individuals seek out 
those worse than themselves as sources of comparison.  As a result, their self-
perception becomes distorted (see Wills, 1981 for review).  McKenna et al. (1991) 
proposed a different explanation, the self-enhancement bias.  They believed that an 
individual’s perceptions are distorted so that they view themselves as superior to others 
around them.  Thus, the self-enhancement bias is a positive-self bias whereas the 
downward comparison theory is a negative-other bias (McKenna et al. 1991).  Some 
research seems to support Wills’ (1981) downward comparison theory (Walton & 
Bathurst, 1998; Groeger & Grande, 1996), arguing that methodological flaws in 
McKenna et al.’s work, such as asking participants to rate themselves compared to the 
“average” driver, may have falsely supported the McKenna et al. (1991) theory of self-
enhancement bias.  
Prior work by Scott et al. (2009) supports the self-enhancement bias as 
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individuals overestimate their driving ability, both when comparing themselves to the 
average driver and when comparing themselves to a known comparison target.  
However, comparison to a known target reduces positive self-bias regarding driving 
ability. This phenomenon of shift in self-view as a function of the compared-to criterion 
showed a disproportionate effect on stroke survivors, who became more accurate about 
their current driving abilities when comparing themselves to a companion whose driving 
skills were well known to them. Thus, comparison to a known target appeared to 
enhance awareness of deficit among stroke survivors.  Scott et al. (2009) also 
suggested that positive self-bias is a trait that may reflect a pervasive characteristic of 
cognitive ability, as the tendency to overestimate driving ability was paralleled on a 
cognitive estimation task. The study by Scott and colleagues highlighted that stroke 
survivors may be doubly hindered in their assessment of their driving ability because of 
the normal adult self-bias and cognitive impairments that undermine their ability to 
estimate themselves accurately.   
Summary and purpose 
Resumption of driving post-stroke is important to community integration and 
functional independence, and it helps prevent feelings of isolation and depression.  
Stroke survivors are frequently left with deficits that hinder them from driving safely.  
Unfortunately, many stroke survivors are uninformed about the barriers they may face in 
safe driving.  Fewer still are formally evaluated to determine whether a return to driving 
would be safe.  Previous work (Scott et al., 2009) indicated that stroke survivors 
overestimate their driving ability, particularly when using an ambiguous comparison 
target, suggesting that the driving self is highly resistant to change, although it may be 
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temporarily malleable.  
Most healthy adults overestimate their driving ability, even in the presence of 
immediate feedback to the contrary. This phenomenon likely reflects the high personal 
valence of independent driving combined with entrenchment of self-view observed for 
many trait characteristics. However, even among healthy drivers, actual skills, and the 
accuracy of estimations of those skills, may vary considerably. Accurate estimations rely 
on fundamental skills in cognitive estimation, self-monitoring, and awareness of deficit: 
In judgments of driving ability, individuals must accurately assess the skills required by 
the task (cognitive estimation), compare their own abilities and performances to those 
demands (self-monitoring), and acknowledge discrepancies therein proportionately 
(awareness of deficit + cognitive estimation). Impairments in cognitive estimation, self-
monitoring, and awareness of deficit are common following stroke; thus, the accuracy of 
the stroke survivor’s self-assessment of driving skills may be hindered by both the 
sequelae of the stroke and by the positive self-bias observed in most adults. In 
combination, these phenomena may render stroke survivors particularly poor judges of 
their ability to drive safely.  
A major gap in the knowledge base is the absence of studies comparing 
estimations of fitness to drive with objective indices of fitness to drive. Some research 
shows that older drivers—including stroke survivors— report that they compensate for 
acquired impairments by strategically limiting their driving exposure; however, the 
relation between perceived and actual deficits in driving skills has not been 
comprehensively examined. Similarly, a number of studies have shown that significant 
others frequently make the decision regarding whether the survivor will resume driving, 
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and if so, how frequently and under what conditions they may drive; however, it also has 
been shown that significant others’ judgments show only modest relation to objective 
indices of the survivor’s fitness to drive, such as neuropsychological functioning or 
actual driving incidents. It is therefore important to examine the accuracy of evaluations 
of driving ability made by survivors and their significant others.  Although the use of 
modern technologies in driving simulation with stroke populations is in its infancy, 
research indicates that it shows promise as a valid and objective index of driving skill 
that provides the opportunity to evaluate stroke survivors in a challenging but safe 
environment. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 1: Among stroke survivors, unawareness of deficits will be inversely 
related to driving simulator performance. Furthermore, it is expected that unawareness 
of functional and cognitive deficits are more predictive of performance in the simulator 
than is unawareness of emotional problems.  Unawareness of deficit will be measured 
via discrepancies between survivor self-report and informant report of survivors on the 
Awareness Questionnaire and the Stroke Impact Scale. 
Hypothesis 2: Awareness of deficit moderates accuracy of self-evaluation of 
simulator performance. Previous research indicates that significant others often decide 
whether the survivor should resume driving; however, it is not clear that they are 
accurate judges. This study will extend those findings (Coleman et al., 2002) by using 
driving as the outcome criterion rather than performance on neuropsychological 
measures.  Hypothesis 2 will examine ratings of the survivor’s driving ability made by 
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the survivor and the significant other and compare them to survivors’ performance on 
the simulator.   
Hypothesis 2a predicts that informant ratings of survivors’ physical and cognitive 
abilities (assessed via the Stroke Impact Scale (SIS) and the Awareness Questionnaire 
(AQ)) will be more strongly correlated with survivor performance on the driving simulator 
than will survivor self-ratings.  
Hypothesis 2b predicts that awareness of deficit (the discrepancy between 
survivors’ SIS and AQ scores) moderates accuracy of survivors’ self-ratings of driving 
performance: Among survivors deemed “aware” of their deficits, self-ratings for 
simulator performance will be significantly more accurate than unaware survivors’ self-
ratings for simulator performance.  
Hypothesis 3: Individual differences in cognitive estimation ability will predict self-
estimation of driving skills on the simulator. Hypothesis 3a predicts that performance on 
the Biber Cognitive Estimation Test will be related to self-evaluations of driving skills on 
the driving simulator and self-evaluations of cognitive, behavioral/affective, and 
motor/sensory abilities: The Biber Cognitive Estimation Test index of estimation 
discrepancy (Biber-Z) will be positively correlated with self-evaluations of driving skill. 
Thus, participants who overestimate on the Biber (positive Biber-Z score) will also rate 
their driving skills on the simulator as high. Additionally, individuals who over- or under-
estimate on the Biber Cognitive Estimation Test will be less accurate on self-estimates 
of their performance in cognitive, behavioral/affective, and motor/sensory abilities (as 
assessed by survivor scores on the domains of the Awareness Questionnaire).   
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Hypothesis 3b predicts that performance on the Biber Cognitive Estimation Test 
will be related to accuracy of self-evaluations of driving skills on the driving simulator: 
The Biber Cognitive Estimation Test index of estimation discrepancy (Biber-Z) will be 
inversely correlated with discrepancies between reported and actual performance on 
the driving simulator. Thus, overestimation on the Biber (positive Biber-Z score) will be 
associated with overestimation of performance on the driving simulator (positive 
discrepancy Self-rated – Actual simulator score), whereas underestimation on the Biber 
(negative Biber Z score) will be associated with underestimation of performance on the 







A total of 108 adults were included in this study: 54 stroke survivors and 54 
significant others of those survivors.  Stroke survivors were at least 3 months post 
stroke. Significant others were defined as individuals who knew the survivor prior to his 
or her stroke and who were considered by the stroke survivors to be “active” in their life. 
Inclusionary criteria for all participants included having driven within 3 months prior to 
the survivor’s stroke, ability to understand English, over 18 years old, free from history 
of severe psychiatric diagnosis, and able to be tested within 3 weeks of their significant 
other. Participants were recruited at discharge from the stroke service at the 
Rehabilitation Institute of Michigan (RIM) and during follow-up care at RIM.  Additional 
participants were recruited from the RIM Driving Education and Training Center, the 
Wayne State University Audiology and Speech Language Pathology Program, and from 
the community.   Each participant was compensated $50 for their participation.   
Measures 
Doron AMOS (Advanced Mobile Operation System)-2 Driving Simulator. This state-
of-the-art simulator is completely interactive and provides 240 degrees of visual field 
contained in a life-sized model of a typical automobile cockpit, with sensory feedback 
including sound, vibration, and moving air. The evaluation takes approximately 45 
minutes and includes four sequences that simulate “real life” encounters: (a) residential 
and light business traffic; (b) rural traffic and roadways (including lane changes); (c) 
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challenging situations that require forethought and quick response time (e.g., near 
collisions, emergency vehicles); and (d) a skills track module that includes assessment 
of brake reaction, front-end parking, and distance estimation.  The specific driving 
scenarios were developed in consultation with RIM’s Driving Evaluation and Training 
Center (DETC) Association for Driver Rehabilitation Specialists (ADED) certified 
evaluators and the technical consultants at Doron, who are nationally recognized as 
leading experts in evaluation and training of driving skills using simulator technology. 
The driving scenarios scores yielded a pass/fail score, and an overall total score as well 
as scores in the following domains: speed maintenance, lane placement, obeying traffic 
signals, stop distance, hazard avoidance, and usage of turn signals.   
Awareness Questionnaire (AQ; Sherer, Bergloff, Boake, High, & Levin, 1998). The 
AQ was developed as a measure of self-awareness after traumatic brain injury.  The 17-
item survey is completed by stroke survivors about their own abilities while a version of 
the form is completed by significant others about the survivor.  The measure was 
designed to assess perception of the survivor’s functioning in three domains: cognitive, 
behavioral/affective, and motor sensory. The ability to perform various tasks after the 
stroke as compared to before the injury are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from "much 
worse" to "much better." Although the scale was originally designed for use among 
persons with traumatic brain injury, the test authors indicate that it is appropriate for use 
in populations with acquired brain injuries (Sherer et al., 1998), and it has been shown 




Stroke Impact Scale (SIS) Version 3.0 (Duncan, Bode, Min Lai, & Perera, 2003).  
The SIS is a widely-used measure of functioning post stroke that was developed to 
determine the impact of stroke on quality of life within the past 1 to 4 weeks. It may be 
used to track changes in impairments and disabilities. The measure is comprised of 59 
items tapping eight domains: strength, hand function, mobility, activities of daily living, 
emotion, memory, communication, and social participation.  The SIS is completed by 
both stroke survivors and significant others, providing external criterion validity. Ratings 
are provided on 5-point scales specific to the domain being evaluated. The SIS scales 
have demonstrated excellent reliability and validity (Duncan et al., 1999; Duncan et al., 
2003). For example, the Physical Scale shows excellent convergent validity with other 
criterion measures of stroke severity (e.g., Barthel Index, Functional Independence 
Measure, Fugl-Meyer, NIH Stroke Scale, SF-36 Physical Scale, and Duke Mobility 
Scale). 
Biber Cognitive Estimation Task (BCET – Bullard et al., 2004): The BCET is believed 
to tap both executive functioning and semantic memory, requiring individuals to make 
reasonable judgments about everyday things.  The 20-item test has five questions in 
each of four domains: quantity, distance, weight, and time.  Individuals must provide 
numerical estimates as well as provide labels/units for their answers.  Example items 
include “How many seeds are there in a watermelon?” and “How long would it take an 
adult to hand write a one page letter?” Responses are scored as correct if the estimate 
falls within the 5th to 95th percentile of estimates produced by the normative sample; 
responses outside the range of those percentiles are considered incorrect. Standard 
scoring of the BCET is a sum of correct items. Normative data indicate a test mean of 
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18.9 (SD = 1.1) and a range of 16 – 20; thus, the test shows a marked ceiling effect and 
restricted range of scores. In the present study, directional quality of responses 
(overestimation and underestimation) was examined by calculating a deviation (Z) score 
for each item and computing the average deviation score across the 20 items of the test 
(BCET-Z; Scott et al., 2009). Thus, a positive score indicated a tendency to 
overestimate the answer, whereas a negative score indicated a tendency to 
underestimate.   Traditional scoring was used to evaluate survivors’ overall performance 
on the measure. 
Metacognitive Awareness of Context-Specific Cognitive Ability (Ergh, 2004): This 
measure borrows from the metacognitive literature and uses Metacognitive Discrepancy 
Scores. Procedures and scoring criteria for the Metacognitive Discrepancy Scores were 
described by Ergh (2004). The measure was used as follows:  Following the 
standardized administration of simulator instructions, the participant was given the 
rating scale (see Appendix A) and asked to predict his/her performance in comparison 
to same-aged healthy people (prediction of performance). The simulator was then 
administered and following this, the participants were again asked to rate their 
performance using the same scale (postdiction of performance).  After completing all 
scenarios within the driving simulator, stroke survivors rated their overall performance in 
the simulator with the metacognitive scale. 
Demographic and other information: Information regarding age, gender, 
handedness, and level of education was collected for all participants.  Additionally, from 




Informed consent procedures were completed with all participants (survivors and 
significant others) per Institutional Review Board guidelines. Stroke survivors meeting 
eligibility qualifications were recruited before discharge from the inpatient unit and asked 
if they agreed to be contacted in the future to monitor their recovery.  If agreeable, the 
survivors completed the consent process and demographic data, lesion location, and 
contact information was gathered.  Significant others present at the survivor’s discharge 
were asked to provide written consent at this time.  Individuals who consented to 
participate were informed that they could decline participation when they were later 
contacted for the study. Approximately 3 months post stroke, the researcher called 
survivors and significant other pairs who had agreed to be contacted.  Individuals still 
willing to participate gave verbal consent and an appointment to complete the measures 
will be scheduled.  Participants recruited from other sites gave written consent at first 
contact with the researcher and appointments were made to complete the measures 
along with their significant other at a future date. All participants were informed that their 
performance on all measures, including the driving simulator, was anonymous and thus 






Prior to analysis, the data were screened for violations of the assumptions 
associated with univariate and multivariate tests.  Variables with non-normal 
distributions that may inflate alpha were transformed to improve normality and linearity.  
Results of this evaluation led to the overall driving simulator outcome variable to be 
winsorized which improved normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006).  Transformed 
variables were used in the statistical analyses and are noted where applicable.   
Demographics for the study sample are presented in Table 1.  Right-side strokes 
accounted for 33.3% of survivors, left-side strokes accounted for 51.9% of survivors, 
and 14.8% had strokes affecting either both hemispheres or the brain stem. The median 
length of time since stroke was 13 months.  Approximately two-thirds of the survivors 
had resumed driving on the road (61.8%).  Motion sickness prevented four participants 
from sufficient completion of the driving simulator to produce valid scores.  Among 
stroke survivors, 90.9% were able to partake in the comprehensive driving simulator 
evaluation.  Demographic variables (education, age, gender, handedness, laterality, 
time since stroke, and actual driving status) for the survivors who completed the driving 
simulator (n = 50) and those that did not complete the simulator (n = 4) are presented in 
Table 2.  
The sample was categorized into two groups based on the Awareness 
Questionnaire (AQ) results (Sherer, 1998). Awareness of deficit was calculated as the 
discrepancy between survivor self-report and informant-report on the survivor on the 
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AQ: AQ Discrepancy = (AQ self-report) – (AQ Significant Other report). Twenty 
participants were classified as showing impaired awareness of deficit (positive AQ 
Difference scores), whereas 34 participants were classified as intact (n = 34; AQ 
Difference scores near zero or negative). Classification was based on the AQ 
Discrepancy Total Score; for exploratory analyses, discrepancy scores were also 
calculated for the three domains assessed by the AQ (cognitive, behavioral/affective, 
and motor/sensory). Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample (total and by 
awareness group) on the AQ variables (self-report, significant-other report, and 
discrepancy scores), as well as the simulator variables.  Demographics are also 
presented for survivors with intact (n = 34) and impaired awareness (n = 20) of their 
deficits (Table 4). Chi-square tests indicated that men and women (p = .61), location of 
stroke (p = .76), and driving status (p = .40) did not differ across level of awareness.  
ANOVAs indicated that awareness of deficits was not associated with significant 
differences on survivor age, education, or time since stroke (all ps > .30).   
Seventy-four percent of survivors failed the driving simulator evaluation and 26% 
passed the evaluation.  When examining the interaction of awareness of deficit and 
pass/fail status, a chi-square analysis (X2 (1, N = 50) = 2.09, p = .32) indicated that level 
of awareness did not significantly predict whether survivors would pass or fail the 
simulator evaluation.  Among survivors with intact awareness of deficit, 27% passed the 
evaluation and 73% failed the simulator evaluation.  Similarly, 26% of survivors with 
impaired awareness of deficit passed the driving simulator evaluation and 74% of 
survivors with impaired awareness failed the evaluation. 
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Significant others (SOs), who were nominated by survivors as someone who 
knew them well and who had been active in the stroke survivor’s recovery, included 
49.1% spouses or romantic partners, 21.3% children of the survivor, 3.7% parents of 
the survivor, 15.7% other family members of the survivor (e.g. sibling), and 8.3% 
described as a friend or other.  Demographics for significant others are presented in 
Table 5.   
Hypothesis 1: Awareness of deficits and simulator performance 
The hypothesis that awareness of deficit is related to simulator driving 
performance was tested with correlational analysis. Table 6 presents the correlations of 
awareness of deficit indices with the simulator outcomes. Among the total sample of 
stroke survivors (N = 54), overall unawareness of deficits was inversely related to 
simulator performance (r = -.31, p = .01). Survivors with less awareness of their deficits 
were worse drivers than were survivors with intact awareness of their deficits.  
Consistent with the hypothesis, unawareness of cognitive and motor/sensory skills 
showed a stronger inverse relationship to driving performance (r = -.33, p = .008 and r = 
-.40, p = .001 respectively) than did awareness of the emotional/behavioral domain (r = 
-.18, p = .10).   
As shown in Table 3, mean Simulator Total score was higher for the group with 
intact awareness than for the group with impaired awareness; however, an independent 
t test indicated that the difference was not significant, t(52) = 1.36, p = .09, d = .38. 
Prediction of simulator performance was related to awareness of overall deficit (r 
= .22, p = .05); however, there was less difference across the individual domains of 
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awareness in their relationships to predicted performance than to actual performance, 
with correlations to the separate domains of awareness ranging from .17 (cognitive) to 
.25 (behavioral/affective abilities).  Postdiction of simulator performance showed a 
pattern similar to prediction: It was related to overall awareness of deficit (r = .22, p = 
.06), with correlations in the individual domains of awareness ranging from .14 
(motor/sensory) to .28 (behavioral/affective).  Among the total sample, actual simulator 
performance was related to simulator prediction (r = .21, p = .07) and simulator 
postdiction (r = .33, p = .01).  Simulator prediction and postdiction were modestly 
correlated (r = .45, p = .001) with one another. 
Lastly, of interest are the modest to strong correlations between indices of 
survivors’ awareness of deficit and indices of accuracy in self-estimated performance on 
the driving simulator evaluation (rs .31 to .53). Accuracy of prediction was represented 
as the difference between predicted simulator performance and actual simulator 
performance (Prediction Accuracy = Predicted – Actual performance); therefore, 
positive T scores reflect overestimation of actual performance. For accuracy of 
prediction, about 15% of survivors underestimated their performance, another 25% 
were within 10 T points of their actual performance, 30% overestimated their 
performance by 10 - 20 T points, and 30% overestimated by > 20 T points. For 
survivors' postdiction accuracy, about 20% underestimated their performance and 24% 
were within 10 T points of their actual performance, whereas 39% overestimated by 10 - 
20 T points and 18% of survivors overestimated by >20 T points. As shown in Table 6, 
the overall awareness of deficit index (AQ Difference Total) showed modest to strong 
relation to both prediction accuracy and postdiction accuracy, with awareness of 
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motor/sensory deficits the most strongly correlated of the AQ domains with prediction 
accuracy (r = .49) and postdiction accuracy (r = .53). Consistent with the hypothesis, r to 
z analyses comparing the magnitude of correlations between awareness of 
motor/sensory deficits and prediction accuracy and awareness of behavioral/affective 
deficits and prediction accuracy indicated that awareness of motor/sensory deficits was 
significantly more strongly related to prediction accuracy than was awareness of 
behavioral/affective deficits (t(51) = 1.80, p = .04).  Similarly, there was a strong similar 
trend for postdiction accuracy and awareness of motor/sensory deficits and postdiction 
accuracy and awareness of behavioral/affective deficits (t(51) = 1.65, p = .05). R to z 
analyses comparing the magnitude of prediction accuracy and awareness of cognitive 
deficits versus prediction accuracy and awareness of behavioral/affective deficits (t(51) 
= 1.20, p = 0.12) and the magnitude of prediction accuracy and awareness of cognitive 
deficits versus prediction accuracy and awareness of motor/sensory deficits (t(51) = -
1.05, p = 0.15) were not significant. Additional r to z analyses that did not reach levels of 
significance included correlations between postdiction accuracy and awareness of  
behavioral/affective deficits and postdiction accuracy and awareness of cognitive 
deficits (t(51)= -1.37, p = 0.09) and postdiction accuracy and awareness of  
motor/sensory deficits and postdiction accuracy and awareness of cognitive deficits 
(t(51) = 0.68, p = 0.75). Thus, as awareness of deficit becomes increasingly impaired 
(high scores indicated impaired awareness), self-estimated performance is increasingly 
overpredicted (high accuracy scores indicate overestimation of actual performance).   
Driving Simulator Performance:  Logistic Regression 
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A logistic regression examined the prediction of driving simulator performance 
(pass, fail), whereas multiple regression analysis examined the prediction of driving 
simulator performance (total score on driving simulator). Predictor variables for these 
regression analyses included survivor’s age, stroke severity (SIS – Physical Scale), and 
awareness of deficit in cognitive, behavioral affective, and motor domains (AQ 
difference). 
A test of the full model with the five predictors against the constant-only model 
was significant, X2 (5, N = 48) = 14.31, Nagelkerke R2 = .37, p = .01, indicating that the 
set of predictors reliably distinguished between survivors who passed and failed the 
driving simulator evaluation. The model correctly classified 85.4% of cases, with 97.1% 
of failing survivors and 53.8% of passing survivors correctly classified.  Using the Wald 
criterion, age (p = .06, odds ratio 0.92), stroke severity (p = .04, odds ratio = 1.06), and 
awareness of behavioral/affective abilities (p = .03, odds ratio = 9.73) made significant 
contributions to predicting whether a survivor passed or failed the driving simulator.    
Driving Simulator Performance: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses 
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the 
prediction of total score on the driving simulator by survivor’s age, stroke severity, and 
awareness of cognitive, behavioral/affective, and motor deficits. The results of the 
multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 7. After step 1, age and stroke 
severity, R2 = .10, F(2, 47) = 2.54, p = .09.  When the remaining predictors were entered 
into the equation after step 2 (awareness of cognitive, behavioral/affective, and motoric 
abilities), they reliably improved the prediction of simulator performance by 24%.  The 
overall model predicted 34% of the variance in simulator performance and was 
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significant, F(5, 47) = 4.41, p = .003.  Examination of the squared correlations indicate 
that awareness of motor or physical deficits (sri2 = .12) contributed the most unique 
variance to the prediction of driving simulator performance, followed by awareness of 
behavioral/affective deficits (sri2 = .10), age (sri2 = .07), stroke severity (sri2 = .04), and 
awareness of cognitive deficits (sri2 = .02).   
Hypothesis 2: Awareness of deficit moderates accuracy of self-evaluation of 
simulator performance  
Awareness status and Self-Estimations of Driving Simulator Performance 
The moderation effect was tested first via split-plot correlation analyses of 
predicted and postdicted estimations to actual simulator performance. Table 8 presents 
correlations between driving simulator indices for stroke survivors with intact (n = 34) 
and impaired (n = 20) awareness of deficit. Simulator prediction and postdiction were 
significantly related to one another among survivors with intact (r = .42) and impaired (r 
= .41) awareness of deficits. Among survivors with intact awareness of their deficits, 
simulator prediction (r = .32) and postdiction (r = .25) showed moderate relationships to 
actual simulator performance (i.e., self-estimates of performance corresponded to 
actual performance). Of note, unlike their counterparts with intact awareness of deficits, 
predicted simulator performance was not significantly related to actual simulator 
performance among survivors with impaired awareness; however, actual simulator 
performance was strongly related to postdiction ratings (r = .53). Therefore, among the 
impaired awareness group, self-estimates of performance did not correspond to actual 
performance before the simulator experience (prediction) but strongly corresponded to 
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actual performance after the simulator experience (postdiction). Overall, awareness of 
deficit moderated self-evaluation of performance before and after the experience of 
driving the simulator.  
Informant versus Survivor Ratings of Survivors’ Abilities and Driving Simulator 
Performance 
Descriptive statistics for indices of survivors' cognitive, behavioral/affective, and 
motor /sensory abilities as rated by the survivor (self-report) and by the informants 
indicated that both stroke survivors and significant others rated survivors’ current 
cognitive (1.8 and 1.4 respectively), motor/sensory (1.62 and 1.26), and 
behavioral/affective (1.85 and 1.56) abilities as a “little worse” to “about the same” as 
they were prior to their stroke, where 0 = “much worse” and 5 = “much better” (Table 3).  
Accuracy of estimated performance by self- and informant-rated abilities 
Further examination of survivors’ relative capacities to evaluate their abilities was 
conducted on the accuracy of predicted and postdicted scores. Table 8 shows a fairly 
consistent pattern of positive correlations between survivor self-ratings and the 
accuracy of their estimated simulator performance, as compared to inverse correlations 
between SO-ratings of the survivors and the accuracy of survivors’ estimations of their 
simulator performance. As shown in Table 8, accuracy of prediction (i.e., Prediction 
Accuracy = Predicted – Actual performance) was related to self-ratings overall (r = .33); 
in the individual domains it related to cognitive ability (r = .30, p = .01) and motor 
sensory ability (r = .40, p = .002) but showed weaker relation to self-ratings of 
behavioral/affective ability (r = .22, p = .06). The same pattern of findings was apparent 
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with accuracy of postdiction (i.e., Postdiction Accuracy = Postdicted – Actual 
performance), which was related to self-ratings overall (r = .34) and in individual 
domains more strongly to cognitive ability (r = .33, p = .01) and motor sensory ability (r = 
.43, p = .001) with weaker relation to self-ratings of behavioral/affective abilities (r = .21, 
p = .07). Therefore, increases in self-ratings of cognitive and motor/sensory abilities 
were associated with overestimations of actual simulator performance prior to the task 
(prediction accuracy) and after completing the task (postdiction accuracy). In contrast, 
accuracy of predicted and postdicted performance showed trends toward inverse 
relation to SO reports of the survivors’ abilities. Accuracy of survivor’s prediction ratings 
showed inverse relation to SO’s ratings overall (r = -.23, p = .05); within the specific 
domains, to the survivors’ cognitive abilities (r = -.22, p = .06), behavioral/affective 
abilities (r = -.18, p = .09) and motor/sensory abilities (r = -.20, p = .08). Accuracy of 
postdiction ratings showed a similar and somewhat stronger pattern: significant inverse 
relation to SOs’ ratings of the survivors’ overall abilities (r = -.30, p = .02), with 
correlations for specific domains cognitive (r = -.28, p = .02), behavioral/affective (r = -
.27, p = .03) and a similar trend for motor/sensory abilities (r = -.21, p = .07).  Survivors 
objectively rated as having recovered the most from their strokes made more accurate 
predictions and postdictions of their simulator performance than did survivors with 
significant cognitive, behavioral/affective, and motor/sensory deficits.  
Fisher’s r-to-z analyses were conducted to compare whether the differences in 
correlations between survivors’ and significant others’ ratings of abilities and accuracy 
of prediction and postdiction were significant. The difference in the magnitudes of 
correlations between prediction accuracy and survivors’ ratings of overall abilities and 
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significant others’ ratings of overall abilities was significant (z = -2.91, p = .00).  Also 
significantly different were the correlations between prediction accuracy and the 
awareness subscales: survivor ratings of cognitive abilities and SO ratings of survivors’ 
cognitive abilities (z = 2.69, p = .00); survivor ratings of behavioral/affective abilities and 
SO ratings of behavioral/affective abilities (z = 2.04, p = .02); and survivor ratings of 
motor/sensory abilities and SO ratings of survivors’ motor sensory abilities (z = 3.16, p < 
.01).  The magnitude of correlations between postdiction accuracy and survivors ratings 
of overall abilities and SO’s ratings of overall abilities was significant (z = 3.52, p < .01).  
Again, the magnitude of correlations between survivors’ postdiction accuracy and 
survivors and significant others ratings of survivors’ abilities on awareness domains 
were compared and found significant: Postdiction accuracy and survivor ratings of 
cognitive abilities and SO ratings of survivors’ cognitive abilities (z = 3.18, p < .01); 
survivor ratings of behavioral/affective abilities and SO ratings of behavioral/affective 
abilities (z = 2.47, p = .01); and survivor ratings of motor/sensory abilities and SO 
ratings of survivors’ motor sensory abilities (z = 3.40, p < .01). 
In the total sample, as SO ratings of survivors decreased (i.e., rated as more 
impaired), survivors’ estimation accuracy was worse. In contrast, as survivors’ self-
ratings increased, self-estimation accuracy worsened (more discrepant from actual). 
The correlations for the two awareness groups between simulator indices and both self-
ratings and SO-ratings of survivors’ abilities also are shown in Table 8. In general, they 
show a pattern similar to that observed in the total sample, but the magnitudes are 
much weaker by comparison, likely due to restriction of range.  
Independent t test indicated that there was a significant difference in prediction of 
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simulator performance between the awareness groups, t(51) = -1.90, p = .03, d = .53.  
The means for the prediction of performance were in the direction indicating that 
survivors who are more aware of their deficits made a lower estimate of their driving skill 
(M = 50.21, SD = 6.68) than did those who had impaired awareness of their deficits (M 
= 54.18, SD = 8.41).  There was also a significant difference between awareness 
groups on postdiction of simulator performance, t(49) = -1.81, p = .04, d = .51. Similarly, 
the means for the postdiction of performance were in the direction indicating that 
survivors who had intact awareness of deficits made a lower evaluation of their driving 
skill (M = 46.73, SD = 5.39) than did those who had impaired awareness of their deficits 
(M = 50.05, SD = 7.71). Additionally, an independent t test (with Levene’s correction for 
heterogeneity of variance) indicated that awareness groups differed significantly in their 
accuracy of prediction, t(28.55) = -2.22, p = .02, d = .68 whereas another independent t 
test  found awareness groups differed significantly in their accuracy of postdiction t(49) 
= -3.22, p = .001, d = .91. The means for the accuracy of prediction and postdiction 
were in the direction indicating that survivors who had intact awareness of deficits made 
more accurate estimates of their driving skill (M = 11.72, SD = 11.03 and M = 7.45, SD 
= 10.21, respectively) than did those who had impaired awareness of their deficits (M = 
21.26, SD = 17.25 and M = 18.36, SD = 13.92, respectively). 
Next, to examine survivors' relative capacities to evaluate their abilities, 
correlational analyses were conducted to determine whether informant ratings of 
survivors’ physical and cognitive abilities were more strongly correlated with survivor 
performance on the driving simulator than were survivor self-ratings of the same 
abilities.  Table 8 presents correlations of self-ratings and SO-ratings of survivors with 
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the simulator evaluation indices for the total sample and the two awareness of deficit 
groups.  Among the total sample, survivor self-ratings of behavioral/affective abilities (r 
= -.07) were unrelated to driving simulator performance (as measured by the simulator 
total score) whereas self-ratings of physical (r = -.29) and cognitive (r = -.24) abilities 
showed significant inverse correlations with driving ability (Table 8). Point-biserial 
correlations indicated that survivors’ ratings of their behavioral/affective (rpb = .08, p = 
.30) and motor sensory (rpb = -.10, p = .24) abilities were not significantly related to their 
pass/fail status on the simulator; however, self-ratings of cognitive abilities were related 
(rpb = -.20, p = .08) to pass/fail status. Contrary to the proposed hypothesis, significant 
others’ reports of stroke survivors’ cognitive (r = .17) and behavioral/affective (r = -.16) 
abilities were not significantly related to the survivors’ driving performance in the 
simulator as measured by the simulator total score (Table 8); the significant others’ 
reports of survivors’ motor/sensory abilities (r = .21, p = .06) were weakly related to the 
simulator total score (Table 8).  The significant others’ ratings of stroke survivors’ 
abilities were not significantly related to the pass/fail status of stroke survivors on the 
driving simulator (rpb .02 to .09). 
As shown in Table 8, correlations for the separate groups of survivors with intact 
and impaired awareness of their deficits were generally small and nonsignificant, 
possibly reflecting restriction of range. Neither self-ratings nor SO ratings of survivors’ 
abilities were well related to actual simulator performance, predicted simulator 
performance, or postdicted simulator performance for either group, with a few notable 
exceptions. Among the group with intact awareness of deficits, SO-ratings of 
motor/sensory abilities were significantly correlated with actual simulator performance (r 
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= .32), as well as predicted (r = .42) and postdicted (r = .37) performance.  Survivor 
ratings of the motor/sensory domain were also significantly correlated with predicted 
performance (r = .34) among the intact awareness group.  
Overall, the survivors’ and informants’ ratings of the survivors abilities showed 
weaker relation to actual simulator performance than did the awareness of deficit 
indexes that were generated from the differences between their ratings.  
In sum, Hypothesis 2 was largely confirmed: Awareness of deficit moderated the 
accuracy of self-evaluation of simulator performance. Among survivors with intact 
awareness of their deficits, prediction and postdiction self-ratings of performance were 
related to actual driving performance. Among survivors with impaired awareness of their 
deficits, only postdiction correlated with actual driving performance.  In contrast to the 
hypothesis, significant others’ reports of survivors’ abilities were not as strongly related 
to actual driving performance as were survivors’ self reports of those same abilities.  
Additionally, the objective and self-ratings of the survivors’ abilities showed weaker 
relation to actual simulator performance than did the awareness of deficit indexes that 
were generated from the differences between their ratings. Further, as objective ratings 
of survivors’ abilities decreased, the accuracy of survivors’ estimation was worse.  In 
comparison, as survivors ratings of themselves increased, their accuracy of estimation 
was worse.   
Hypothesis 3: Cognitive estimation ability predicts self-estimation of driving skills 
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the sample (total and by awareness 
group) on the BCET variables (traditional and Z scoring).  Independent t tests indicated 
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that survivors with intact and impaired awareness of deficits differed on their estimation 
of quantity with traditional BCET scoring (t(50) = 2.60, p < .01, d = .75). Independent t 
tests indicated that awareness of deficits was not otherwise associated with significant 
differences on cognitive estimation tests (all ps > .12). 
Cognitive Estimation and Self-Estimation 
To determine whether general skills in cognitive estimation were related to self-
evaluations of driving skills on the simulator, correlational analyses were conducted 
between the BCET and driving simulator indices (Table 10). Differences in findings were 
apparent when different methods of scoring the BCET were instituted.  When using 
BCET Z scores and examining the total sample of stroke participants, simulator 
prediction was correlated with general cognitive estimation skill (r = .46, p = .00).  Actual 
simulator performance (r = .10, p = .25) and simulator postdiction (r = .08, p = .29) were 
unrelated to cognitive estimation among the total sample.  Among survivors with intact 
awareness, general cognitive estimation skill was related to simulator prediction (r = .41, 
p = .008) but not to simulator postdiction (r = .02, p = .46) or actual simulator 
performance (r = .06, p = .36).  A strong positive relationship was also found between 
simulator prediction and general cognitive estimation skill among the group with 
impaired awareness (r = .56, p = .01). A Fisher’s r to z analysis indicated that the 
magnitude of the correlations between intact and impaired survivors and prediction of 
driving ability and general cognitive estimation skill was not significant (z = -0.65, p = 
.74). Similar to survivors with intact awareness, simulator postdiction (r = .21, p = .22) 
and actual simulator performance (r = .10, p = .35) were not substantially related to 
cognitive estimation among stroke survivors with impaired awareness.  When using 
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traditional scoring methods for the BCET and examining the total survivor sample, 
general cognitive estimation was related to actual driving performance (r = .23, p = .05) 
but not related to prediction (r = .05, p = .36) or postdiction (r = .16, p = .14) of driving 
ability. Among survivors with intact awareness, general cognitive estimation was not 
related to actual driving performance (r = .26, p = .07) or predicted (r = -.01, p = .49) or 
postdicted (r = .27, p = .06) ability to drive although there was a small trend toward 
significance for actual and postdicted performance. There were no significant 
correlations between general cognitive estimation and actual driving ability (r = .16, p = 
.27) and prediction (r = .19, p = .23) or postdiction (r = .11, p = .34) of ability for 
survivors with impaired awareness of deficits.  
Correlational analyses were also conducted comparing cognitive estimation and 
self-evaluations of cognitive, behavioral, or motor/sensory abilities (Table 11). In the 
total sample, cognitive estimation (as determined with the Z scores) and self-ratings of 
cognitive abilities (r = .05, p = .34) and motor/sensory abilities (r = .09, p = .26) were not 
related. Cognitive estimation was also not meaningfully related to the survivors’ 
behavioral/affective abilities (r = .18, p = .10).  For survivors with intact awareness, 
cognitive estimation and survivor self-estimates of cognitive abilities (r = .34, p = .02 and 
motor/sensory abilities (r = .37, p = .02) were significantly related, with a similar trend 
observed for behavioral/affective abilities (r = .28, p = .06).  Among survivors with 
impaired awareness, cognitive estimation and survivor self-estimates of cognitive 
abilities (r = -.06, p = .41), behavioral/affective abilities (r = .22, p = .19), and 
motor/sensory abilities (r = -.03, p = .46) were not significantly related.  When using 
traditional scoring of the BCET, correlations between survivor rated abilities and general 
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cognitive estimation mostly ranged from moderate to strong.  Among all survivors, 
cognitive estimation was significantly related to self-rated cognitive (r = -.46, p = .00), 
behavioral/affective (r = -.35, p = .01), and motor/sensory (r = -.45, p = .00) abilities.  For 
survivors with intact awareness of deficits, cognitive estimation was significantly related 
to self-rated cognitive abilities (r = -.41, p = .01) but not to survivor opinions of 
behavioral/affective (r = -.19, p = .14) or motor/sensory abilities (r = -.19, p = .14).  The 
relationship between cognitive estimation and self-rated cognitive (r = -.51, p = .02), 
behavioral/affective (r = -.46, p = .03), and motor/sensory (r = -.66, p < .01) abilities was 
strong amongst survivors with impaired awareness of deficits.  
Cognitive Estimation and Accuracy of Self-Estimates of Driving Skill 
Accuracy of prediction (z scoring: r = .12, p = .19; traditional scoring: r = -.20, p = 
.09) and postdiction (z scoring: r = -.09, p = .28; traditional scoring: r = -.19, p = .10) was 
unrelated to general cognitive estimation skill among survivors.  Among survivors with 
intact awareness, prediction (z scoring: r = .19, p = .15; traditional scoring: r = -.27, p = 
.07) and postdiction (z scoring: r = -.08, p = .34; traditional scoring: r = -.25 , p = .09) 
were not significantly related to cognitive estimation (Table 10).  Similarly, among 
survivors with impaired awareness, cognitive estimation was not significantly related to 
prediction (z scoring: r = .12, p = .32; traditional scoring: r = -.06, p = .41) and 






Impaired awareness of deficits among stroke survivors predicted poor driving 
performance in the simulator.  The findings indicated that awareness of cognitive 
deficits and motor/sensory deficits were more strongly associated with driving 
performance than was awareness of behavioral and affective problems. These findings 
were paralleled in general cognitive estimation skills: Persons who tended to 
overestimate external things like quantity, distance and time also overestimated 
(overpredicted) their driving skills.  Additionally, awareness of deficit moderated 
survivors’ accuracy of self-evaluation of driving skill: Survivors with intact awareness of 
their deficits showed ability to predict their actual driving performance prior to driving in 
the simulator and evaluate their performance accurately after driving the simulator.  In 
contrast, survivors with impaired awareness of deficits showed poor prediction of their 
actual performance in the driving simulator; however, the accuracy of their self-
evaluations improved substantially after completing the driving simulator task 
(postdiction).   
 Survivors with intact or impaired awareness of deficit did not differ in age, 
education, or time since stroke and their cognitive, behavioral/affective, and 
motor/sensory abilities were evaluated as a little worse to about the same as they were 
prior to their strokes. Age, stroke severity, and awareness of deficits provided unique 
information about fitness to drive.  When considering overall driving skills, as predicted, 
awareness of motor/sensory deficits contributed the most substantial value to the 
prediction of driving ability, followed by awareness of behavioral/affective deficits, age, 
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stroke severity, and awareness of cognitive deficits.  In determining whether survivors 
passed a driving evaluation, age, stroke severity, and awareness of behavioral/affective 
deficits uniquely contributed to driving performance.  These findings suggest that 
evaluating survivors’ awareness of deficit is an important factor in determining fitness to 
drive.  
Awareness of Deficit and Driving Performance 
 Survivors with impaired awareness of their deficits were worse drivers than were 
survivors with intact awareness of their deficits. Specifically, impaired awareness of 
cognitive and especially motor/sensory deficits predicted poor driving, and they were 
substantially stronger predictors than was awareness of emotional and behavioral 
deficits. These findings support previous research showing that awareness of disability 
moderates driving outcomes (Ryan et al., 2009).  It also expands the literature by 
replicating Ryan et al.’s (2009) finding in a different neurologically impaired population 
and with a different outcome measure of driving (driving simulator versus driving 
records).   
 The source of ability estimates and how these opinions predicted driving 
simulator performance was important.  Survivors’ estimates of physical and cognitive 
abilities were more strongly related to survivor performance on the driving simulator 
than were informant estimates of the same abilities.  Contrary to prediction, there was 
not a strong link between significant others’ opinions of stroke survivors’ cognitive, 
motor/sensory, and behavioral/affective abilities and the survivors’ driving. Previous 
research (Coleman et al., 2002; Scott et al., 2009) has shown that significant others 
47 
 
often decide whether stroke survivors resume driving but often do so without 
considering objective indices of fitness to drive.  The present findings may suggest that 
even if presented with objective evidence of survivors’ abilities, significant others 
consider other factors and do not make decisions about survivors’ resumption of driving 
based on objective evidence.  Another explanation for the findings is that although 
significant others are accurately estimating survivors' cognitive, behavioral/affective, and 
motor/sensory deficits, the survivors’ awareness of those deficits is actually more 
pertinent to driving ability.  Indeed, these findings indicate that survivors' awareness of 
their deficits was a stronger indicator of driving performance than were survivor or 
significant other estimates of survivors’ abilities alone. 
 In support of the theory that awareness is multidimensional and may vary across 
domains (see Orfei et al., 2007 for a review), differential awareness of cognitive, 
motor/sensory, and behavioral/affective deficits was suggested by the differential 
relationships between these domains and simulator performance in this study.  Poor 
awareness of cognitive and motor/sensory deficits was strongly predictive of poor 
performance in the driving simulator whereas awareness of behavioral/affective deficits 
was unrelated to simulator performance.  Individuals with impaired awareness of their 
behavioral/affective deficits overestimated their driving skills prior to and after a driving 
evaluation whereas individuals with impaired awareness of their motor/sensory deficits 
overpredicted their driving skills prior to the evaluation.  Impaired awareness of 
cognitive deficits was not associated with prediction or postdiction of driving skill.  It may 
be also be that poor awareness of cognitive and motor/sensory skills, and therefore the 
lack of feedback about these skills, is particularly detrimental to a survivor’s ability to 
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predict and adjust ratings of their driving ability.  Stroke survivors’ ability to accurately 
predict driving skills prior to resuming driving after stroke and then make accurate 
estimations of driving performance is clearly important in ensuring both the safety of the 
survivor and other drivers on the road.  If survivors predict they will not be able to 
resume driving safely, or if they return to driving and recognize that their driving skills 
are insufficient, they can seek out drivers’ rehabilitation training or alternative methods 
of transportation.  
Awareness of deficit moderates accuracy of self-evaluation of simulator performance 
Among survivors aware of their deficits, prediction and postdiction of driving skill 
were modestly related to actual simulator performance; among survivors unaware of 
their deficits, only postdiction estimates were related to actual driving skill. One possible 
explanation for this pattern of self-evaluation is that although survivors in general may 
overestimate their driving ability (Scott et al., 2009) survivors with impaired awareness 
of deficits overestimate their level of driving skill and underappreciate their deficits.  
Therefore, survivors with impaired awareness of their deficits were less likely to 
accurately predict their driving skills; however, after driving, their self-evaluations were 
strongly associated with their actual performance and the accuracy of their self-
evaluations improved substantially.  Thus, survivors with impaired awareness of their 
deficits benefitted substantially from the experience in terms of improved accuracy of 
self-evaluation and they benefitted more than did the participants with intact awareness. 
Groeger and Grande’s work (1996) suggests that feedback provided about driving skill 
may be beneficial in improving the accuracy of an individual’s estimate of a specific 
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driving behavior; however, overall opinion of driving ability is not influenced by instructor 
feedback on an actual driving task.  
Although the present study indicates that stroke survivors may have sufficient 
cognitive flexibility to adjust their awareness of deficits, and therefore may be able to 
adjust their driving accordingly, it is unclear how long the improved insight into driving 
skill may last.  It is unclear whether survivors would alter their opinions of themselves as 
a driver overall or would change the accuracy of their predictions of driving skills at 
some point in the future.  Despite this unanswered question, the potential positive 
influence of using the driving simulator as an intervention to improve both driving skills 
and accuracy of self-evaluation of those skills warrants further investigation.   
 Additionally, as survivors' opinions of their general abilities improved, they 
became less accurate in their self-estimates of driving skill.  This relationship was 
observed for self-estimates of cognitive and motor/sensory abilities but not for 
behavioral/affective abilities and it suggests a tendency for overestimation across 
domains among stroke survivors.  In contrast, survivors’ perspectives of their cognitive, 
behavioral/affective, and motor/sensory abilities were not related to whether survivors 
passed the driving evaluation. Interestingly, significant others’ perspectives on survivors’ 
behavioral/affective abilities were related to whether they passed the driving evaluation.  
As survivors’ ability to manage their behavior and affective experiences declined, as per 
significant others’ report, survivors became more likely to fail the driving evaluation.  It is 
likely that methodological issues account for the limited predictive value of pass/fail 
status on the driving simulator. Due to its dichotomous nature, pass/fail outcome was 
less sensitive than the continuous simulator outcome in evaluating driving skill.  
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Additionally, the pass/fail outcome included survivors recommended to drive with 
restrictions or after remediation of skill and survivors who may have driven well 
throughout the evaluation except for one significant error, such as causing a major 
accident.  These factors reflect the non-linear nature of the pass-fail designation.   
 In Scott et al. (2009), overestimation of driving ability (as compared to an 
"average driver") was mirrored on a performance task.  This research extends that work 
by demonstrating that overestimation of driving ability (accuracy of actual driving 
performance) was mirrored in overestimation of ability to perform life skills.  
Furthermore, as significant others' evaluations of survivors' abilities improved, so did the 
accuracy of survivors estimates of their own driving skill.  This supports the use of 
significant others as accurate informants on survivors’ abilities.  
Cognitive Estimation and Self-Estimation of Driving Ability 
Cognitive estimation has been described as a process of using readily-available 
common knowledge in a novel manner to answer a question for which an exact answer 
is not known (Shallice & Evans, 1978). Although much of the prior research on cognitive 
estimation has focused on its relationship to other cognitive skills (Axelrod & Millis, 
1994; Brand et al., 2003; Bullard et al., 2004), Scott et al. (2009) found that 
overestimation on general cognitive estimation tasks was related to overestimation of 
driving skills.  This work adds to the current literature by extending these findings: 
Survivors general tendency to over- and underestimate cognitive skills was associated 
with prediction of performance on the simulator in both survivors with intact and 
impaired awareness of their deficits. This relationship was stronger amongst survivors 
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with impaired awareness of their deficits. Additionally, cognitive estimation was 
modestly related to awareness of cognitive and motor/sensory abilities among survivors 
with intact awareness of deficit such that the more accurate survivors were in their 
cognitive estimation, the more favorably they evaluated their abilities.  However, 
cognitive estimation scores were minimally related to actual driving performance and 
not related to postdiction or the accuracy of self-evaluations of driving skills on the 
simulator.  The present findings support the idea that an underlying mechanism of 
estimation pervades cognition and sense of self (Scott et al., 2009).  However, it 
appears that feedback on performance (through actual driving experience) or having 
additional data to use in making estimates may alter survivors’ awareness of their 
abilities.  This may provide a unique opportunity to raise stroke survivors’ awareness of 
driving ability and improve driving safety.   
 Conclusions and implications 
In conclusion, the present study demonstrated that knowledge of survivors’ 
awareness of deficit provides substantial information in understanding survivors’ driving 
ability.  Awareness of deficit was related to actual driving skill.  More specifically, 
awareness of cognitive and motor/sensory deficits was related to actual driving skill 
whereas awareness of behavioral/affective deficits was related to prediction and 
postdiction of driving skill.  Awareness of deficit was also strongly associated with the 
accuracy of prediction and post-evaluation estimates made by stroke survivors.  
Survivors with intact awareness of deficit demonstrated better driving skills and were 
more accurate in their prediction of these driving skills as compared to survivors with 
impaired awareness of their deficits. Survivors with impaired awareness of deficit 
demonstrated substantially improved accuracy in their postdiction as compared to 
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survivors with intact awareness of deficit. Thus, the opportunity to drive in a simulator 
appeared beneficial to survivors in that when provided with feedback, survivors became 
better at evaluating their level of driving skill. Potentially, survivors could use this 
information to alter their driving habits.  Awareness of deficit was also associated with 
cognitive estimation.  Among survivors with intact awareness of deficit, survivors’ 
opinions of their abilities were associated with cognitive estimation skill, however; 
among survivors who were unaware of their deficits, estimates of abilities and cognitive 
estimation were unrelated.  Cognitive estimation was related to driving ability in that 
persons who overestimated on a cognitive estimation task overestimated driving skill, 
but it was not related to accuracy of predictions or postdictions of driving skill.  The 
findings together suggest that stroke survivors may benefit from interventions to 
improve awareness of deficit.  
However, the generalizability of the findings is limited by the relatively small 
sample size and relatively low power.  Furthermore, the large number of tests that were 
run increased experiment-wise alpha. On-road assessment is the gold-standard for 
driving evaluation and the design of the study could have been improved if survivors 
completed an on-road evaluation in addition to the driving simulator.  Although the 
simulator and driving scenarios were designed to be life-like, driving in the simulator 
was a novel experience for the participants and it may be that their estimates of 
performance would have been different if they were driving on-road.  Another limitation 
of this study is the characteristics of the present sample who were, on average, younger 
than typical stroke survivors who may have had multiple strokes.  A larger sample of 
survivors and the inclusion of other neurologically impaired populations would likely 
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improve generalizability.  Future research should examine the relationship between 
training on the driving simulator and on-road driving assessments to evaluate if there is 




Table 1. Demographic Statistics for Stroke Survivors (N = 54). 
Variable M SD Range 
Stroke Survivors    
Age (years) 55.6 (9.7) 32 – 81 
Education (years) 14.1 (2.4) 9  – 20 
Percent Men 54.5   
Percent Right Handed 96.3   
Location of stroke (%)    
 Left 51.9   
 Right 33.3   
 Bilateral or other 14.8   
Percent driving 61.1   





Table 2.  Demographic Statistics of Survivors who Completed the Simulator and Did Not 
Complete the Simulator. 
 
Group 
Survivor Simulator  
Completers (n = 50) 
Survivors Simulator 
Incomplete (n = 4) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Age (years) 55.4 10.0 58.5 4.4 
Education (years) 13.9 2.3 16.3 1.3 
Percent  Male 58.0  25.0  






 Left 50.0  75.0  
 Right 34.0  25.0  
 Bilateral/other 16.0  0  
Time since stroke (months) 45.5 78.2 29.3 14.7 





Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Awareness Groups (Intact n = 34, Impaired n = 20) and 
the Total Sample (N = 54). 
 
 Group   
 
Intact 
(n = 34) 
Impaired 
(n = 20) 
Total    
(N = 54)  
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Range 
Awareness Questionnaire (AQ):  
Self-report:     
Total Score 25.2 (6.2) 38.0 (13.6) 29.9 (11.4) 16.0 – 68.0 
Cognitive Subscale 1.5 (0.5) 2.3 (0.9) 1.8 (0.8) 0.7 – 4.0 
Behavioral/Affective Subscale 1.6 (0.5) 2.3 (0.8) 1.9 (0.7) 0.5 – 4.0 
Motor/Sensory Subscale 1.4 (0.5) 2.1 (0.9) 1.6 (0.7) 0.3 – 4.0 
     
SO-report on survivor:     
Total Score 28.5 (7.4) 19.3 (8.3) 24.2 (7.9) 8.0 – 39.0 
Cognitive Subscale 1.7 (0.5) 1.1 (0.5) 1.4 (0.5) 0.1 – 2.1 
Behavioral/Affective Subscale 1.8 (0.6) 1.3 (0.6) 1.6 (0.6) 0.3 – 3.3 
Motor/Sensory Subscale 1.4 (0.4) 1.1 (0.5) 1.6 (0.5) 0.5 – 2.0 
     
AQ Discrepancy Total -0.2 (0.4) 1.1 (0.6) 0.3 (0.8) 8.0 – 39.0 
AQ Discrepancy - Cognitive -0.2 (0.4) 1.2 (0.7) 0.3 (0.9) 0.1 – 2.1 
AQ Discrepancy - Motor/Sensory 
-0.03 (0.5) 1.0 (0.7) 0.4 (0.8) 0.3 – 3.3 
AQ Discrepancy - Behavioral/Affective -0.3 (0.6) 1.1 (0.7) 0.2 (0.9) 0.5 – 2.0 
     
Simulator:     
Simulator Overall (T Score) 38.5 (11.0) 33.6 (15.4) 36.7 (12.9) 2.0 – 59.8 
Simulator Prediction 50.2 (6.7) 54.2 (8.4) 51.7 (7.6) 37.5 – 67.5 
Simulator Postdiction 46.7 (5.4) 50.1 (7.7) 48.0 (6.5) 40.0 – 62.5 
Simulator Prediction Accuracy 11.7 (11.0) 21.3 (17.3) 15.3 (14.3) -8.2 – 64.7 











(n = 34) 
Impaired Awareness  
(n = 20) 
F(1,52) 
or X2(1) p 
Variable M SD M SD   
Age (years) 55.3 9.0 56.1 11.0 0.09 .77 
Education (years) 13.9 2.6 14.5 1.9 0.87 .36 
Percent  Male 52.9  60.0  0.25 .61 





 0.55 .76 
   Left 50.0  55.0    
   Right 35.3  30.0     
   Bilateral/other 14.7  15.0      
Time since stroke (months) 44.5 72.7 43.8 81.7 0.00 .97 
Percent driving 64.7  55.0  0.72 .40 
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Table 5. Demographic Statistics for Stroke Survivors’ Significant Others (N = 54). 
Variable M SD Range 
Significant Others    
Age (years) 46.6 (14.1) 18 - 72 
Education (years) 13.9 (2.3) 10 – 20 
Percent Men 29.6   
Percent Right Handed 92.6   
Kinship (%)    
 Spouse/Romantic Partner 49.1   
 Adult Child 21.3   
 Parent 3.7   
 Other Family 15.7   
 Friend 8.3   






















Simulator Predicted .21† -- -- -- -- 
Simulator Postdicted .33** .45** -- -- -- 
Awareness of deficit: AQ Difference Total 
-.31* .22† .22† .42** .49** 
AQ Difference - Cognitive 
-.33** .17 .17 .41** .48** 
AQ Difference - Behavioral/Affective 
-.18† .25* .28* .31** .37** 
AQ Difference - Motor/Sensory 
-.40** .20† .14 .49** .53** 
Note. AQ = Awareness Questionnaire, Total score, and Cognitive, Behavioral/Affective, and Motor/Sensory domains; AQ Difference 
= (Survivor self-report) – (SO-report on survivor). Accuracy of predicted performance = (Predicted performance – Actual simulator 
performance); Accuracy of postdicted performance = (Postdicted performance – Actual simulator performance). † p < .10, *p < .05, 
















































AQ Cog Diff 
 
AQ Beh Diff 
 





























4.41 5,47 .003 .24 .004 
Note. sr2 (unique) = squared semipartial correlation; AQ Cog Diff = AQ Patient Cognitive Subscale – 
Significant Other Cognitive Subscale; AQ Beh Diff = AQ Patient Behavioral/Affective Subscale – 
Significant Other Behavioral/Affective Subscale; AQ Mot Diff = AQ Patient Motor Subscale – Significant 





Table 8. Correlations: Driving Simulator Performance and Ratings of Abilities for Stroke Survivors with Intact (n = 34) and Impaired (n 
= 20) Awareness of Deficit. 










 Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired 
Simulator Predicted .21† .32* .21 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Simulator Postdicted .33** .29† .53* .45** .42* .41* -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
                
Self-rated abilities (AQ)                
Total score -.22† -.15 -.14 .24* .27† .03 .16 .11 -.01 .33** .31* .13 .34** .24† .11 
  Cognitive  -.24* -.07 -.25 .14 .17 -.09 .10 -.02 -.03 .30* .17 .17 .33** .08 .20 
  Behavioral/Affective  -.07 -.13 .14 .30* .19 .21 .19† .19 -.01 .22† .25† -.04 .21† .23† -.14 
  Motor/Sensory  -.29* -.17 -.28 .23* .34 -.01 .18 .14 .03 .40** .38* .24 .43** .32* .28 
                
SO-rated abilities (AQ)                
Total score .19 .15 .09 -.04 .28† -.08 -.13 .10 -.10 -.23* -.02 -.16 -.30* -.05 -.15 
  Cognitive  .17 .10 .07 -.08 .12 .00 -.12 -.03 .05 -.22† -.03 -.10 -.28* -.08 -.09 
  Behavioral/Affective  .16 .06 .14 -.01 .27† -.09 -.18† .07 -.24 -.18† .10 -.20 -.27* .04 -.27 
  Motor/Sensory  .21† .32* -.02 .03 .42** -.19 -.20† .37* -.06 -.20† -.17 -.11 -.21† -.14 .04 
Note. SO-rated = significant-other ratings of the survivor’s abilities; AQ = Awareness Questionnaire. Accuracy of predicted performance = (Predicted – Actual 





Table 9. Descriptive Statistics and Comparison for Awareness Groups (Intact n = 34, Impaired n 
= 17). 
 
 Group   
 
Intact 
(n = 34) 
Impaired 
(n = 17)   
Cognitive Estimation M SD M SD t (49) d 
Z - Scoring       
BCET Total 0.15 0.57 0.04 0.70 0.60 .18 
BCET Quantity  0.01 0.87 0.32 1.62 -0.88 .26 
BCET Weight  0.44 1.12 0.47 1.22 -0.11 .03 
BCET Distance  -0.04 0.92 -0.34 0.72 1.14 .33 
BCET Time  0.18 0.90 -0.28 0.74 1.83 .53 
       
Traditional Scoring       
BCET Total  18.22  1.52 17.72  1.89 1.02 .30 
BCET Quantity  4.65  0.65 4.08  0.93 2.60** .75 
BCET Weight  4.70  0.64 4.69  0.70 0.04 .01 
BCET Distance  4.45  1.06 4.55  0.83 -0.31 .09 
BCET Time  4.44  0.79 4.29  0.92 0.60 .17 
       
Note:   BCET = Biber Cognitive Estimation Test.  Z-scoring = directional scoring.  d = Cohen’s d. 





Table 10. Correlations: Driving Simulator Performance and Ratings of Abilities for Stroke Survivors with Intact (n = 34) and Impaired 
(n = 17) Awareness of Deficit. 










 Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired 
Cognitive Estimation                
BCET Total Z .10 .06 .10 .46** .41** .56** .08 .02 .21 .12 .19 .11 -.09 -.08 -.05 
   BCET Time .08 -.11 .27 .23† .17 .51* .19† .19 .40† .03 .22 -.03 -.08 .11 -.12 
   BCET Distance .12 .25† -.17 .34** .23† .72** -.02 -.09 .24 .06 .12 .51* -.10 -.30* .43* 
   BCET Quantity .17 .24† .16 .34** .24† .43* -.03 -.19 .06 -.01 -10 .00 -.22† -.39* -.24 
   BCET Weight -.11 -.18 -.03 .22† .34* .03 .08 .12 .02 .21† .40* .01 .18 .32* .02 
BCET Total Correct .23* .26† .16 .05 -.01 .19 .16 .27† .11 -.20† -.27† -.06 -.19 -.25† .00 
   BCET Time -.02 -.03 .09 .18† .03 .60** -.05 -.01 .01 .13 .05 .20 .01 -.03 .01 
   BCET Distance .18† .29 -.13 -.01 .09 -.35† .13 .23 -.16 -.16 -.24 -.04 -.12 -.25 .12 
   BCET Quantity .10 -.16 .16 -.11 .00 -.16 .10 .22 .07 -.17 .16 -.17 -.09 .26† .01 
   BCET Weight .28* .31* .36† -.10 -.21 .02 .25* .04 .55* -.39** -.46** -.39† -.25* -.38* -.19 
Note. BCET = Biber Cognitive Estimation Test.  BCET Z = Directional scoring.  BCET Correct – Traditional scoring.  Accuracy of predicted performance = 





Table 11.  Correlations of Cognitive Estimation and Ratings of Abilities for Stroke Survivors (N = 54) with Intact (n = 34) and Impaired 
(n = 20) Awareness of Deficit. 
 
 Self-rated Total Self-rated Cognitive Self-rated Behavioral/Affective 
Self-rated 
Motor/Sensory 
 Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired Total   Intact  Impaired 
Cognitive Estimation             
BCET Total - Z .11 .41** .03 .05 .34* -.06 .18† .28† .22 .09 .37* -.03 
BCET Time -.05 .31* -.09 -.15 .09 -.18 .12 .46** .10 -.09 .20 -.16 
BCET Distance -.00 .34* -.15 .07 .48** -.16 -.04 .16 -.14 -.07 .08 -.11 
BCET Quantity .16 .09 .12 .10 .21 -.03 .25* -.09 .40† .06 .09 -.04 
BCET Weight .13 .22 .09 .07 .06 .09 .08 .13 -.03 .26* .45** .15 
BCET Total Correct -.46** -.35* -.58** -.46** -.41** -.51* -.35** -.19 -.46* -.45** -.19 -.66** 
BCET Time -.29* -.10 -.51* -.36** -.22 -.54* -.18† -.08 -.31 -.20† .15 -.56* 
BCET Distance -.14 -.33* -.06 -.11 -.31* .04 -.13 -.31* -.08 -.15 -.15 -.24 
BCET Quantity -.44** -.00 -.56** -.43** -.10 -.50 -.38** .06 -.55** -.39** .07 -.50* 
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Fifty-four stroke survivors completed a driving evaluation. Measures included 
predicted, postdicted, and actual performance on a driving simulator evaluation and a 
modified Biber Cognitive Estimation Test. Survivors nominated a significant other to 
serve as a knowledgeable informant about their abilities. Awareness of deficit was 
assessed via survivor-significant other difference scores on the Awareness 
Questionnaire. Five predictors (age, stroke severity, and awareness of cognitive, 
behavioral/affective, and motor abilities) reliably distinguished between survivors who 
passed and failed the driving simulator evaluation and predicted 34% of the variance in 
simulator prediction.   Unawareness of cognitive and motor/sensory skills showed a 
stronger inverse relationship to driving performance than did awareness of the 
emotional/behavioral domain.  Awareness of deficit moderated the accuracy of 
survivors’ self-evaluations of their simulator performance (predicted and actual): Among 
survivors aware of their deficits, simulator prediction and postdiction scores were 
modestly related to actual simulator performance; among survivors unaware of their 
82 
 
deficits, only postdiction correlated with simulator performance. Level of awareness did 
not affect correlations between self-ratings of cognitive, behavioral/affective and 
motor/sensory abilities and actual simulator performance, predicted simulator 
performance, or postdicted simulator performance. Survivor self-ratings of 
behavioral/affective abilities were unrelated to driving simulator performance whereas 
self-ratings of motor/sensory and cognitive abilities were negatively correlated with 
driving ability.  General cognitive estimation skills were positively correlated with 
prediction of performance on the simulator in both the aware and unaware survivor 
groups, with stronger prediction for the unaware participants. However, cognitive 
estimation scores were not related to the accuracy of self evaluations of driving skills on 
the simulator. Thus, stroke survivors who overestimated their cognitive and 
motor/sensory abilities made less accurate estimates of their driving ability and 
performed worse in a driving simulator than did survivors who were aware of their 
deficits; however, the accuracy of their self-ratings improved significantly after the 
simulator evaluation. This work supports research showing that awareness moderates 
driving ability and that awareness is multidimensional.  Furthermore, the driving 
simulator may be a useful tool in raising survivors’ awareness of their deficits as it 
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